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Law,	Social	Policy	and	the	Constitution	of	Markets	and	Profit	Making	
Kenneth	Veitch
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Abstract	
This	article	explores	the	relationship	between	law,	society	and	economy	in	the	context	of	the	
contemporary	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	 UK.	 Drawing	 on	 themes	 in	 Karl	 Polanyi’s	 The	 Great	
Transformation,	the	article	identifies	the	nature	of	the	constitutive	role	of	contemporary	social	
policy	and	 law	 in	 the	creation	and	maintenance	of	markets	and	opportunities	 for	 the	private	
sector	 in	 the	 field	of	welfare.	By	 reference	 to	 recent	 legislative	 reforms	and	developments	 in	
health	 care	 and	 unemployment	 policy,	 the	 article	 focuses	 on	 the	 institutional	mechanisms	 –	
especially	forms	of	law	and	social	relations	–	being	put	in	place	to	foster	a	friendly	environment	
for	 those	 seeking	 to	 profit	 from	 welfare.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 what	 emerges	 from	 those	
developments	and	reforms	is	a	reformulation	of	the	function	of	the	welfare	state	and	related	
law:	no	longer	are	these	predominantly	driven	by	a	logic	of	social	protection	via	redistribution	
to	those	in	need;	rather,	they	increasingly	form	core	components	of	the	state’s	desire	to	create	
openings	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 within	 welfare.	 In	 Polanyi’s	 terms,	 the	 result	 is	 that	 the	
institutions	 that	 once	 contributed	 to	 ensuring	 the	 embeddedness	 of	 the	market	 economy	 in	
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society	now	play	an	 important	role	 in	processes	of	disembedding	–	a	state	of	affairs	 that	has	
potentially	detrimental	consequences	for	those	seeking	assistance	from	the	welfare	state.	
Introduction	
Social	policy	and	related	 legislation	present	an	opportunity	 to	consider	 fundamental	 issues	of	
law,	economy	and	 society	 and,	 importantly,	 the	 interplay	between	 them.	As	 such,	 they	 form	
fertile	subjects	for	engaging	with	an	economic	sociology	of	law.	In	recent	years,	however,	there	
has	been	a	tendency	in	some	academic	literature	to	treat	them	as	if	they	were	distinct	entities.	
The	 standard	 analysis	 and	 critique	 of	 neoliberalism,	 for	 instance,	 conceptualises	 the	
development	of	the	so-called	self-regulating	market	as	demanding	a	corresponding	diminution	
of	the	social	or	welfare	state.	The	result	is	that	the	social	and	the	economic	appear	in	conflict	
with	each	other,	with	the	economic	sphere	being	viewed	as	unable	to	function	properly	where	
the	 social	 persists.
2
	 This	 article	 challenges	 this	 portrayal	 of	 neoliberalism	 by	 exploring	 the	
connections	between	law,	economy,	and	society.	Specifically,	 it	 identifies	the	constitutive	role	
of	contemporary	 law	and	social	policy	 in	creating	and	maintaining	markets	and	opportunities	
for	profit	making	within	the	welfare	sector.
3
	
In	one	sense,	social	policy	has	always	been	bound	up	with	questions	and	problems	of	economy.	
The	 welfare	 state	 illustrates	 this	 vividly.	 Thus,	 through	 discharging	 its	 core	 function	 of	
protecting	 citizens	 against	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 risks	 of	 capitalism,	 welfare	 institutions	
																																																																		
2
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indirectly	assisted	the	capitalist	mode	of	production.	For	instance,	publicly	funded	health	care	
and	education	benefited	employers	by	ensuring	a	 flow	of	healthy,	 knowledgeable	and	skilled	
workers.	What	 can	 be	witnessed	 today,	 however,	 is	 a	more	 direct	 role	 for	 social	 policy	 and	
related	 legislation	 in	 supporting	 capital	 –	 something	 that	 has	 implications	 for	 assumptions	
surrounding	the	traditional	functions	of	the	welfare	state.	Via	a	focus	on	recent	developments	
and	 reforms	 within	 health	 care	 and	 unemployment	 policy	 and	 law,	 the	 article	 develops	 an	
analysis	 of	 the	 types	 of	 institutional	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 being	 deployed	 to	 facilitate	 the	
implementation	of	this	more	direct	role	of	social	policy	and	law.	
In	order	to	frame	the	discussion	and	analysis,	the	article	draws	on	some	themes	and	concepts	
from	 a	work	 that	 has	 to	 a	 degree	 inspired	 the	 development	 of	 economic	 sociology	 and	 the	
nascent	 economic	 sociology	 of	 law	 –	 namely,	 Karl	 Polanyi’s	 The	 Great	 Transformation.
4
	 Two	
specific	features	of	Polanyi’s	work	render	it	useful	in	the	present	context.	The	first	is	his	idea	of	
the	 embeddedness	 of	 the	market	 economy	 in	 society	 and	 social	 relations;	 the	 second	 is	 the	
stress	 he	 places	 on	 state	 intervention	 as	 an	 indispensable	 element	 in	 the	 construction	 of	
markets.	Those	features	of	his	work	provide	a	conceptual	framework	through	which	to	reflect	
on	 the	 important	 changes	 in	 the	 roles	 of	 current	 social	 policy	 and	 law.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	
allows	 for	 a	 focus	on	 their	 constitutive	 functions	 in	 respect	of	markets	 and	opportunities	 for	
profit	 making	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 within	 the	 field	 of	 welfare.	 Specifically,	 it	 directs	 us	 to	
consider	the	types	of	institutional	mechanisms	–	including	the	forms	of	law	and	social	relations	
–	that	have,	and	are	being,	created	for	the	purpose	of	facilitating	such	objectives.	On	the	other	
hand,	 it	 confronts	 us	 with	 key	 questions	 regarding	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 welfare	 state	
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continues	to	operate	as	a	source	of	social	protection	for	citizens	against	the	consequences	and	
risks	 flowing	 from	capitalism.	As	we	will	 see,	 in	 some	circumstances	 today’s	 social	policy	and	
law	 are	 being	 deployed	 in	 ways	 that	 create	 conditions	 for	 precisely	 the	 production	 of	 such	
consequences	and	risks.	
The	reciprocal	relationship	between	social	and	economic	policy	
One	 of	 the	many	 virtues	 of	 Karl	 Polanyi’s	The	Great	 Transformation	 is	 its	 insight	 that	 a	 self-
adjusting	market	(what	he	also	calls	the	market	economy)	cannot	exist	for	any	length	of	time	
before	it	results	in	the	destruction	of	natural	and	human	life.5	This	state	of	affairs	would	mean:	
no	less	than	the	running	of	society	as	an	adjunct	to	the	market.	Instead	of	economy	being	embedded	in	social	
relations,	social	relations	are	embedded	in	the	economic	system	…	For	once	the	economic	system	is	organized	in	
separate	institutions,	based	on	specific	motives	and	conferring	a	special	status,	society	must	be	shaped	in	such	a	
manner	as	to	allow	that	system	to	function	according	to	its	own	laws.
6
	
Famously,	Polanyi	goes	on	to	 illustrate	 this	scenario	by	reference	to	 the	dangers	arising	 from	
the	 fictitious	 commodification	 of	 land,	 labour	 and	 money	 that	 emerged	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
eighteenth	century	and	tightened	 its	grip	during	the	nineteenth.	Rather	than	 land	and	 labour	
‘form[ing]	part	of	the	social	organization	itself’,7	as	was	the	case	in	the	mercantile	system,	these	
natural	and	human	elements	of	society	became	subject	to	the	price	mechanism,	the	operation	
of	which	was	to	have	devastating	social	consequences.	Disembedded	from	social	organisation	
and	thrust	under	a	system	operating	on	the	principles	of	gain	and	 ‘unconscious	growth’,8	 the	
functions	of	land	and	labour	shifted	from	the	non-economic	to	the	economic,	and	society	had	
to	 take	measures	 to	protect	 itself.	Moreover,	Polanyi	 stresses	 that	 the	 self-regulating	market	
																																																																		
5
	id.	
6
	id.,	p.	60.	
7
	id.,	p.	72.	
8
	id.,	p.	35.	
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was	not	 some	 sort	 of	 free-floating	 entity	 that	 emerged	out	of	 thin	 air	 and	operated	without	
support	 of	 any	 kind.	 Rather,	 state	 intervention	was	 crucial	 in	 establishing	 and	 enforcing	 the	
doctrine	of	laissez-faire	and	the	operation	of	the	self-regulating	market.	As	Polanyi	notes	of	the	
1830s	and	1840s,	there	emerges	‘an	enormous	increase	in	the	administrative	functions	of	the	
state,	which	was	now	being	endowed	with	a	central	bureaucracy	able	to	fulfil	the	tasks	set	by	
the	adherents	of	liberalism.’9	
Against	this	backdrop,	Polanyi’s	thesis	is	that	the	economic	system	must	always	be	embedded	
in	social	relations	if	it	is	to	function	for	the	benefit	of	society.	He	notes	the	types	of	measures	
society	was	adopting	to	protect	itself	against	the	self-regulating	market.	Thus,	for	example,	he	
charts	 the	 development	 from	 the	 1870s	 of	 strong	 Trades	 Unions	 that	 negotiate	 wages	 and	
conditions	 of	 labour	 outside	 of	 the	 self-regulating	market.	Moreover,	 such	measures	 had	 as	
their	 objective	 non-monetary	 interests	 such	 as	 ‘professional	 status,	 safety	 and	 security,	 the	
form	of	a	man’s	life,	the	breadth	of	his	existence,	the	stability	of	his	environment’.10	It	was	the	
need	 for	 social	 protection	 to	 address	 the	 ‘social	 interests	 of	 different	 cross	 sections	 of	 the	
population	[…]	threatened	by	the	market’	that	mattered.11	According	to	Polanyi,	such	measures	
had	 restored	 the	 social	 embeddedness	 of	 market	 economy	 and	 thereby	 ensured	 the	
indivisibility	of	the	economic,	the	political	and	the	social.	This,	he	said,	reflected	Robert	Owen’s	
insistence	‘on	the	social	approach’12	within	New	Lanark	in	Scotland:	
New	Lanark	had	taught	[Owen]	that	in	a	worker’s	life	wages	was	only	one	among	many	factors	such	as	natural	
and	home	surroundings,	quality	and	prices	of	commodities,	stability	of	employment,	and	security	of	tenure	…	
The	 education	 of	 children	 and	 adults,	 provision	 for	 entertainment,	 dance,	 and	 music,	 and	 the	 general	
																																																																		
9
	id.,	p.	145.	
10
	id.,	p.	161.	
11
	id.,	p.	162.	
12
	id.,	p.	178.	Emphasis	in	original.	
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assumption	 of	 high	moral	 and	 personal	 standards	 of	 old	 and	 young	 created	 the	 atmosphere	 in	which	 a	 new	
status	was	attained	by	the	industrial	population	as	a	whole.
13
	
For	 present	 purposes,	 two	 aspects	 should	 be	 noted	 from	 Polanyi’s	 book:	 the	 first	 is	 the	
importance	placed	on	the	social	embeddedness	of	markets	as	the	conditio	sine	qua	non	of	the	
maintenance	of	society;	the	second,	related	to	this	and	especially	relevant	here,	is	that	for	the	
social	embeddedness	thesis	to	be	meaningful,	the	self-protective	measures	adopted	by	society	
from	 the	1870s	onwards	had	 to	 serve	non-economic	 interests	 (‘the	 form	of	 a	man’s	 life,	 the	
breadth	of	his	existence’	etc.).	That	is,	they	had	to	ensure	that	markets	and	the	economy	were	
rooted	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 society	 and	 reflected	 the	 non-economic	 interests	 and	 values	
associated	with	man’s	life.	
Published	 in	 1944,	 Polanyi’s	 book	 appeared	 just	 before	 the	 establishment	 in	 the	 UK	 of	 the	
institutions	of	societal	self-protection	that	have	come	to	be	known	collectively	as	the	welfare	
state.	 Before	 assessing	 whether	 and	 how	 some	 recent	 examples	 of	 social	 policy	 and	 law	 sit	
within	 Polanyi’s	 embeddedness	 framework,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 get	 a	 sense	 of	 how	 the	
relationship	between	economic	and	social	policy	has	played	out	over	the	course	of	the	welfare	
state’s	history.	We	can	usefully	do	so	by	referring	to	some	of	Bob	Jessop’s	work	on	the	capitalist	
state.	
In	 The	 Future	 of	 the	 Capitalist	 State,14	 Jessop	 develops	 an	 ideal	 typical	 analysis	 of	 what	 he	
identifies	as	the	two	dominant	 forms	of	capitalist	state	 in	the	post-WWII	era	–	the	Keynesian	
Welfare	 National	 State	 (KWNS)	 and	 the	 Schumpeterian	 Competition	 State	 or	 Schumpeterian	
Workfare	Postnational	Regime	 (SWPR).	 Two	points	 from	his	 analysis	 are	 relevant	 for	present	
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	B.	Jessop,	The	Future	of	the	Capitalist	State	(2002).	
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purposes.	 First,	 Jessop	 stresses	what	 he	 calls	 “the	 regulation	 approach”	 to	 capitalism,	which	
posits	that	stable	capital	accumulation	is	unlikely	to	result	from	the	operation	of	market	forces	
alone.	 Rather,	 it	 requires	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 state	 and	 other	 ‘non-market	mechanisms’.	
These	‘shap[e]	the	dynamic	of	accumulation	as	well	as	being	shaped	by	that	dynamic.’15	In	other	
words,	 accumulation	 (economic)	 regimes	 and	 political	 regimes	 co-evolve.	Moreover,	 ‘choices	
among	economic	and	social	policies	are	 typically	 linked	 to	prevailing	accumulation	strategies,	
state	projects,	hegemonic	projects	and	more	general	philosophical	and	normative	views	of	the	
good	society.’16	Secondly,	in	this	context	Jessop	explores	the	changing	productive	role	of	social	
policy	in	capital	accumulation	regimes	since	the	War	–	something	he	argues	is	often	overlooked	
in	analyses	that	concentrate	on	the	decommodifiying	and	redistributive	features	of	the	welfare	
state.	 Let	 us	 now	 look	 briefly	 at	 this	 second	 aspect	 of	 his	 work	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 two	
features	of	social	policy	that	will	form	the	focus	of	the	reflections	in	the	remainder	of	the	paper.	
Jessop	 first	 discusses	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘the	 social	 reproduction	 of	 labour-power	 as	 a	 fictitious	
commodity’.	 In	 the	 era	 of	 the	 KWNS,	 the	 state,	 rather	 than	 families	 and/or	 liberal	 market	
forces,	becomes	the	key	player	 in	this	reproduction.	Here,	the	socialisation	of	 life	risks	occurs	
via	a	system	of	comprehensive	and	(near-)universal	measures	designed	to	redistribute	wealth	
to	 those	 in	 need.	 Access	 to	 these	 measures	 was	 based	 mainly	 on	 ‘past,	 present	 or	 future	
participation	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 and/or	 on	 national	 citizenship.’17	 In	 contrast,	 within	 the	
SWPR	 or	 Workfare	 State	 we	 have	 witnessed	 what	 Jessop	 describes	 as	 ‘the	 increasing	
																																																																		
15
	id.,	p.	1.	
16
	id.,	p.	44.	
17
	id.,	p.	150.	
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subordination	 of	 social	 policy	 to	 economic	 policy’.18	 This	 occurs	 primarily	 as	 a	 result	 of	
internationalisation	and	the	need	for	national	states	to	remain	economically	competitive,	 lest	
they	risk	capital	flight.	In	those	circumstances,	the	welfare	state	comes	to	be	viewed	as	both	an	
onerous	cost	of	production	and	an	obstacle	to	a	flexible	labour	market	–	the	latter	deemed	to	
be	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 economically	 competitive.	 The	 welfare	 state	 was	 therefore	
redesigned	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 to	 help	 facilitate	 and	 enhance	 the	 establishment	 of	
flexible	 labour	 markets.	 One	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 this	 occurred	 was	 (and	 is)	
workfare	 –	 a	 social	 policy	 that	makes	 the	 receipt	 of	 state	unemployment	benefit	 conditional	
upon	signing,	and	complying	with,	a	contract	stipulating	a	variety	of	work-related	activities	to	
be	undertaken	with	a	view	to	returning	 the	unemployed	to	 the	 labour	market.	Those	 ‘active’	
labour	policies	differ	 from	the	KWNS’s	 ‘passive’	system	of	unemployment	support,	where	the	
unemployed	 were	 effectively	 unconditionally	 entitled	 to	 receive	 state	 support.	 Today,	 the	
discourse	is	firmly	one	of	obligation	and	Jessop	notes	that	it	reflects	‘a	general	movement	away	
from	the	social	democratic	tradition’.19	We	will	return	to	workfare	later.	
Jessop	also	highlights	the	shift	away	from	‘collective	consumption’	in	today’s	SWPR.	Collective	
consumption	 –	 the	 publicly	 organised	 and	 financed	 provision	 of	 goods	 and	 services,	 such	 as	
education,	health,	and	housing	by	a	particular	form	of	national	state	–	has	given	way	‘to	more	
market-	and/or	third	sector	solutions	to	the	socialization	of	consumption’.20	Features	indicative	
																																																																		
18
	On	this	theme,	see	J.	Clarke,	‘Subordinating	the	Social?	Neo-liberalism	and	the	Remaking	of	Welfare	Capitalism’	
(2007)	21	Cultural	Studies	974.	
19
	Jessop,	op	cit.,	p.	155.	Reference	omitted.	
20
	id.,	p.	162.	
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of	this	trend	include	the	following:	1)	an	increased	role	for	the	private	and	third	sector
21
	in	the	
provision	 of	 social	 services,	 which	 may	 involve,	 for	 instance,	 outright	 privatisation	 or	 such	
provision	 by	 those	 sectors	 combined	 with	 public	 payment,	 or	 the	 application	 of	 market	
discourse	 and	 practices	 within	 a	 publicly	 funded	 and	 provided	 service	 (such	 as	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 internal	market	 within	 the	 UK’s	 National	 Health	 Service	 (NHS)	 in	 the	
1990s);	and,	2)	greater	reliance	on	public-private	partnerships	as	a	mode	of	governance	within	
the	welfare	sector.	In	other	words,	the	function	of	social	policy	is	no	longer	simply	to	ensure	the	
public	 financing	 of	 publicly	 delivered	 social	 services.	 The	 prising	 open	 of	 this	 monopoly	 to	
include	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	means	that	social	policy	 is,	at	 least	 in	part,	now	
specifically	designed	to	facilitate	opportunities	for	profit	making.	
Jessop’s	 work	 on	 the	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 economic	 and	 social	 policy	 since	 the	
1940s	presents	two	key	issues	that	might	fruitfully	be	refracted	through	the	prism	of	Polanyi’s	
work,	outlined	earlier.	First,	there	is	a	suggestion	that	social	policy	and	the	institution	created	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 society’s	 self-protection	 against	 the	 detrimental	 social	 consequences	
produced	by	capitalism	–	the	welfare	state	–	have	been	redesigned	in	order,	predominantly,	to	
support	 the	 very	 source	of	 those	 consequences	–	 that	 is,	 capitalism.	This	 is	 at	odds	with	 the	
impact	of	the	forms	of	social	protection	that	Polanyi	charted	from	the	1870s	onwards	as	these,	
he	argued,	ensured	that	the	economic	system	became	re-embedded	in	the	social	–	that	is,	that	
those	measures	protected	non-monetary	 interests,	such	as	 ‘the	form	of	a	man’s	 life’	and	‘the	
breadth	of	his	existence’.	In	Polanyi’s	terminology,	this	contemporary	shift	in	the	predominant	
																																																																		
21
	According	to	the	House	of	Commons	Public	Accounts	Committee,	the	third	sector	includes	‘voluntary	and	
community	organisations,	charities	and	social	enterprises,	ranging	from	small	local	community	groups	to	large,	
established,	national	and	international	organisations.’	HC	Public	Accounts	Committee,	Building	the	Capacity	of	the	
Third	Sector	(2009),	p.	1.	
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function	of	social	policy	and	the	welfare	state	from	a	source	of	social	protection	for	citizens	to	a	
facilitator	 of	 markets	 and	 opportunities	 for	 profit	 making	 represents	 a	 disembedding	 of	 the	
economy	from	social	relations,	resulting	in	‘the	running	of	society	as	an	adjunct	to	the	market’.	
Moreover,	we	encounter	here	a	reversal	of	Polanyi’s	double	movement	thesis,	in	which	forms	
of	 social	 protection	 are	 created	 in	 order	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 deleterious	 effects	 of	 markets;	
rather,	 the	 institutional	 forms	 of	 social	 protection	 today	 shed	 at	 least	 part	 of	 this	 protective	
function	and	are	deployed,	instead,	towards	ends	the	social	consequences	of	which	the	welfare	
state	traditionally	offered	protection	against.	The	result	is	a	disembedding	of	the	economy	via,	
inter	alia,	institutions	formerly	associated	with	ensuring	its	embeddedness.	
If	establishing	markets	and	facilitating	opportunities	to	obtain	profit	are	core	functions	of	social	
policy	 today,	 then	 a	 second	 issue	 arises.	 This	 involves	 identifying	what	 kinds	of	mechanisms,	
including	legal	ones,	are	used	for	this	purpose,	and	what	forms	of	social	relations	are	expressed	
through	 those	 mechanisms.	 Here,	 we	 are	 less	 concerned	 with	 Polanyi’s	 concept	 of	
embeddedness	and	more	with	his	observation,	reiterated	by	Jessop,	that	state	 intervention	is	
crucial	 in	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 markets	 and	 possibilities	 for	 capital	 accumulation.	 In	
particular,	 it	 is	 the	 political	 formulation	 and	 deployment	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 institutions	 and	
institutional	 mechanisms,	 and	 through	 these,	 the	 construction	 and	 use	 of	 specific	 forms	 of	
social	 relation,	 that	must	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 attention	 here.	 As	 Loïc	Wacquant	 argues,	 what	 is	
required	when	trying	to	grasp	the	slippery	phenomenon	of	neoliberalism	is	a	shift	from	‘a	‘thin’	
economic	conception	centred	on	the	market	to	a	‘thick’	sociological	conception	centred	on	the	
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state	 that	 specifies	 the	 institutional	 machinery	 involved	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 market	
dominance	…’
22
	
By	reference	to	two	examples	from	recent	social	policy	and	law,	the	following	section	illustrates	
the	relevance	of	those	two	themes	in	Polanyi’s	work	for	understanding	the	constitutive	role	of	
social	 policy	 and	 law	 in	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 markets	 and	 opportunities	 for	 profit	
making	within	the	welfare	sector.	
Constituting	 Markets	 and	 Profit	 Making	 Opportunities	 –	 Health	 Care	 and	
Workfare	
(i)		 Solidarity	and	Reforming	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	
The	 first	 mechanism	 that	 is	 increasingly	 deployed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 and	
maintaining	markets	and	opportunities	 for	profit	 accumulation	 is	 the	monetary	 fund	 through	
which	social	services	within	the	welfare	state	are	traditionally	paid	for.	The	operating	principle	
of	this	type	of	fund	is	solidarity.	This	denotes	that	citizens’	resources	are	pooled	for	the	purpose	
of	spreading	risk	and	that	there	is	an	element	of	redistribution	within	society.	The	management	
of	social	risks	is	therefore	not	merely	the	preserve	of	those	who	can	afford	to	purchase	private	
insurance;	rather,	it	is	undertaken	by	the	state	on	behalf	of	non-owners	of	insurance.	While	this	
redistributive	aspect	of	the	fund	has	traditionally	implemented	an	underlying	concern	for	social	
justice	and	the	protection	against	social	risk	of	those	lacking	means,	as	Alain	Supiot	notes	there	
is	also	an	impersonal	element	to	this	‘welfare	state’	form	of	solidarity.	For	while	founded	on	the	
redistributive	 ethos	 described,	 the	 system	 posits	 a	 formal	 set	 of	 social	 relations	 amongst	
																																																																		
22
	Wacquant,	op	cit.,	p.	71.	
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citizens,	 rather	 than	 one	 based	 on	 close	 local	 or	 customary	 social	 bonds.	 Citizens	 therefore	
make	payments	to	bureaucratic	institutions	and	then	bring	claims	for	access	to	social	goods	and	
services	such	as	health	care	and	pensions.	This	lends	a	technical	quality	to	the	system.23	
The	argument	advanced	here	is	twofold.	First,	there	is	evidence	in	contemporary	social	policy	
that	 points	 to	 the	 use	 of	 this	monetary	 fund	 and	 certain	 types	 of	 law	 to	 create	 and	 sustain	
markets	 and	opportunities	 for	profit	making	within	 the	 field	of	welfare.	 The	 result	 is	 a	novel	
form	of	redistribution	–	that	is,	from	the	public	to	the	private	sector	–	which,	as	we	shall	see,	
has	 implications	 for	our	understanding	of	 solidarity	 and	 the	use	 to	which	 the	 social	 relations	
characteristic	of	this	principle	are	put.	Secondly,	the	impact	of	these	changes	has	the	potential	
to	result	in	a	disembedding	of	the	economy	from	society	as	the	resources	of	the	welfare	state	
no	longer	necessarily	operate	to	protect	those	in	need	from	the	consequences	of	capitalism.	
Some	 recent	 developments	 in	 the	 NHS	 serve	 to	 illustrate	 those	 arguments.	 One	 is	 the	
prominent	role	of	public-private	partnerships	(PPPs;	formerly	the	Private	Finance	Initiative)	as	
ways	 of	 funding	 new	 NHS	 hospital	 buildings.	 Here,	 private	 contractors	 raise	 the	 money	 to	
finance	the	construction	of	hospitals	 for	the	NHS	and,	via	the	PPP	contract,	own	and	manage	
the	hospital.	The	NHS	Primary	Care	Trust	 leases	the	hospital	and	staff,	such	as	cleaners,	 from	
the	contractors,	paying	what	is	known	as	a	‘unitary	charge’	for	these	from	their	annual	health	
care	budget.	Contracts	 last	for	periods	ranging	from	25-30	years,	although	once	they	are	paid	
off,	the	NHS	does	not	necessarily	end	up	owning	the	premises.	The	PPP	scheme	has	been	the	
object	 of	 cogent	 critique.24	 As	 well	 as	 being	 a	 social	 cost	 in	 monetary	 terms	 –	 that	 is,	 a	
																																																																		
23
	See	A.	Supiot,	Homo	Juridicus:	On	the	Anthropological	Function	of	the	Law	(2007),	pp.	207-12.	
24
	See,	for	instance,	A.M.	Pollock,	NHS	plc:	The	Privatisation	of	Our	Health	Care	(2004).	
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mechanism	by	which	to	facilitate	the	accumulation	of	capital	and	profit	via	the	redistribution	of	
money	 from	 public	 funds25	 –	 it	 also	 has	 potential	 social	 costs	 in	 human	 terms,	 as	 the	 often	
onerous	contractual	obligations	to	pay	for	PPP	financed	buildings	can	jeopardise	the	existence	
of	NHS	hospitals,	thereby	endangering	the	treatment	of	patients.26	
	Aspects	of	the	recent	reforms	to	the	NHS	in	England	confirm	this	trend.	The	Health	and	Social	
Care	Act	2012	 replaces	Primary	Care	Trusts	with	 clinical	 commissioning	 groups	 (CCGs)	 as	 the	
bodies	responsible	for	commissioning	(purchasing)	most	health	care	services	within	the	NHS	(a	
task	 that	 will	 involve	 responsibility	 for	 spending	 £80bn	 of	 NHS	 resources).	 By	 2016,	 it	 will	
become	 possible	 for	 CCGs	 to	 outsource	 their	 commissioning	 work	 to	 non-public	 bodies	 –	
including	private	firms.	A	market	will	therefore	effectively	be	created	for	such	services	and	be	
funded	 from	 the	 NHS	 budget.	 The	 legislation	 also	 promotes	 the	 ‘any	 qualified	 provider’	
approach	to	the	provision	of	NHS	health	care	services	–	meaning	there	will	be	increased	scope	
for,	inter	alia,	private	health	care	providers	to	become	involved	in	the	provision	of	NHS	health	
care.	The	scope	for	private	sector	involvement	is	also	heightened	by	the	promotion	of	‘fair	and	
effective’	 competition	 and	 the	 application	 of	 competition	 law	 to	 the	 commissioning	 of	 NHS	
treatment	for	the	first	time.	The	sector	specific	regulator	for	health	care	–	Monitor	–	is	under	a	
duty	to	promote	provision	of	health	care	services	which	 is	 ‘economic,	efficient	and	effective’,	
and	to	exercise	its	functions	in	a	manner	that	will	prevent	anti-competitive	behaviour	in	health	
																																																																		
25
	An	analysis	by	The	Guardian	newspaper	 in	2012	found	that	the	current	717	PFI	contracts,	while	having	a	total	
capital	value	of	£54.7bn,	would	have	an	ultimate	cost	of	£301bn	once	paid	off.	See	The	Guardian	(6	July	2012)	pp.	
1	&	18.	As	Hellowell	and	Pollock	note,	one	of	the	reasons	for	this	 inflated	cost	 is	that	‘the	cost	of	finance	on	PFI	
schemes	 is	higher	than	 is	 the	case	 for	publicly	 financed	schemes	…’.	M.	Hellowell	and	A.M.	Pollock,	 ‘The	Private	
Financing	of	NHS	Hospitals:	Politics,	Policy	and	Practice’	(2009)	29	Economic	Affairs	13.	There	is	also	evidence	of	a	
so-called	Secondary	Market	in	PFI	shareholdings	in	hospitals,	schools,	roads	and	prisons.	See	BBC	Radio	4’s	File	on	
4	programme	‘PFI	Profits’,	broadcast	on	19
th
	June	2011.		
26
	 The	 recent	 placing	 of	 South	 London	 Healthcare	 Trust	 into	 administration	 owing	 to	 an	 unsustainable	 deficit	
created	by	the	contractual	obligation	to	pay	PFI	costs	is	a	case	in	point.	Also,	see	Hellowell	and	Pollock,	id.	
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care	provision	that	 is	against	patient’s	 interests.27	 It	will	also	be	able	 to	 tackle	specific	abuses	
and	unjustifiable	restrictions	that	demonstrably	act	against	patients’	 interests	by	deploying	its	
licensing	powers	and,	where	relevant,	the	Competition	Act	1998.	The	effect	will	be	to	alter	the	
current	situation,	 in	which	the	bulk	of	NHS	services	are	commissioned	from	public	bodies,	by	
creating	a	 level	playing	 field	 in	which	private	providers	of	health	care	can	compete	to	deliver	
NHS	healthcare	services.	CCGs	will	need,	 in	effect,	 to	ensure	that	a	 tendering	process	 for	 the	
provision	of	NHS	services	is	in	place,	if	they	are	not	to	fall	foul	of	competition	law.	
Those	developments	and	reforms	do	not	mean	that	redistribution	in	the	original	sense	of	that	
term,	 described	 above,	 no	 longer	 occurs	 within	 the	 NHS	 or	 that	 patients	 must	 now	 pay	 to	
access	NHS	services;	access	to	treatment	based	on	clinical	need	rather	than	the	ability	to	pay	
continues	to	be	advanced	as	a	core	principle	of	the	NHS	across	the	political	spectrum.28	Nor	is	it	
claimed	that	those	recent	policies	disclose	the	first	instance	of	any	type	of	relationship	between	
the	 NHS	 and	 capital.	 For	 instance,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 since	 its	 inception	 the	 NHS	 has	
maintained	in	good	condition	what	Marx	referred	to	as	‘a	disposable	industrial	reserve	army’.29	
But	 the	 NHS	 was	 not	 originally	 designed	 to	 be	 a	 source	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 and	 profit	
making	in	itself	–	that	is,	as	an	institution	the	private	sector	became	directly	involved	in	running	
or	 helping	 to	 manage.	 The	 policies	 and	 legislation	 described	 above	 indicate	 that	 this	 has	
changed.	
																																																																		
27
	Health	and	Social	Care	Act	2012,	s.62.	What	the	phrase	‘against	patients’	interests’	means	is	unclear.	
28
	‘It	is	our	privilege	to	be	custodians	of	the	NHS,	its	values	and	principles.	We	believe	that	the	NHS	is	an	integral	
part	 of	 a	 Big	 Society,	 reflecting	 the	 social	 solidarity	 of	 shared	 access	 to	 collective	 healthcare,	 and	 a	 shared	
responsibility	to	use	resources	effectively	to	deliver	better	health.’	Department	of	Health,	Equity	and	Excellence:	
Liberating	the	NHS	(2010;	Cm.	7881),	at	7,	para.	1.1.	
29
	K.	Marx,	Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	Economy,	Volume	1	(1976),	at	p.	784,	and	generally	pp.	781-802.	
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The	 shift	 entails	 a	political	 reformulation	of	 the	ends	 to	which	public	 resources	 are	directed.	
This	manifests	itself	in	the	public	fund	being	made	to	adopt	another	redistributive	dimension	–	
namely,	to	act	as	a	direct	source	for	the	extraction	of	private	wealth.	It	also	has	implications	for	
the	 idea	 of	 the	 socialisation	 of	 risk	 that	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 solidarity,	 as	 its	
meaning	is	no	longer	confined	to	describing	the	community’s	pooling	of	resources	to	the	end	of	
protecting	 its	 members	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 social	 misfortune	 (such	 as	 illness);	 rather,	 as,	 for	
example,	 PPPs	 demonstrate,	 it	 also	 incorporates	 the	 deployment	 of	 this	 common	 fund	 to	
protect	those	in	the	private	sector	from	a	variety	of	economic	risks.	As	Pollock	et	al	note	of	PFI	
(now	PPP)	 contracts,	 they	 rarely	 transfer	economic	 risks	 to	 the	 funding	 consortium,	with	 the	
result	that	these	usually	fall	on	the	public	and	its	purse.	For	instance:	‘Where	a	Trust	wishes	to	
terminate	 a	 contract,	 either	 because	 of	 poor	 performance	 or	 insolvency	 of	 the	 private	
consortium,	 it	 still	 has	 to	 pay	 the	 consortium’s	 financing	 costs,	 even	 though	 the	 latter	 is	 in	
default.’
30
	This	social	protection	from	economic	risk	might	be	thought	to	have	a	more	general	
meaning	 too	 in	 that	making	 available	 the	welfare	 state’s	 public	 funds	 for	 the	 private	 sector	
opens	up	an	invaluable	source	of	income	and	potential	market	and	profit	making	opportunities	
at	 times,	 such	 as	 the	 present,	 of	 sluggish	 economic	 growth	 at	 the	macro	 level.	 Importantly,	
though,	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 function	 of	 the	 socialisation	 of	 risk	 has	 the	 concomitant	 effect	 of	
exposing	 the	community	and	 its	members	 to	a	diminution	 in	 the	 level	of	 social	protection	as	
money	is	diverted	away	from	core	services	to	the	interests	of	capital	–	something	that	dilutes	
the	original	redistributive	objective	of	the	fund.	
																																																																		
30
	A.M.	Pollock	et	al,	‘Private	Finance	and	“Value	for	Money”	in	NHS	Hospitals:	A	Policy	in	Search	of	a	Rationale?’	
(2002)	324	British	Medical	Journal	1205,	at	1208-09.	
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Legally,	this	novel	function	of	the	socialisation	of	risk	might	be	conceptualised	as	a	case	of	joint	
and	several	liability,	not	merely	in	the	familiar	sense	of	debtors	being	held	jointly	and	severally	
liable	only	for	their	own	debts,	but	in	the	sense	of	a	group	being	ascribed	such	a	liability	for	the	
debts	 or	 costs	 or	 harms	 of	 others	 outside	 of	 the	 group	 too.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 foregoing	
examples,	this	means	that,	via	the	medium	of	contract,	taxpayers	become	jointly	and	severally	
liable	 for	 repaying	 the	 significant	 costs	 of	 PPP	building	projects,	 including	 costs	 flowing	 from	
any	default	on	the	part	of	the	private	funding	consortium.	In	turn,	and	perversely,	citizens	also	
become	 liable	 for	 the	 social	 costs	 they	 themselves	 suffer	 (lack	 of	 access	 to	 adequate	 health	
care,	 say)	 as	 these	 flow	 from	 the	 liability	 to	 pay	 the	 financial	 costs	 of	 PPPs	 from	 public	
resources.	 Andreas	 Wildt’s	 description	 of	 the	 Roman	 Law	 concept	 from	 which	 the	 idea	 of	
solidarity	originates	–	obligatio	in	solidum	–	assists	 in	highlighting	some	of	themes	involved	in	
this	contemporary	set	of	arrangements:	
To	be	the	cosignatory	of	a	loan	means	that	one	is	liable	for	the	reversals	of	fortunes	of	another;	that	one’s	own	
economic	well-being	is	no	longer	completely	in	one’s	own	hands	...	The	bonds	of	fraternal	recognition	...	are	not	
blood	bonds	in	this	Roman	conception,	nor	are	they	affective.	Neither	genes	nor	love,	but	liability	is	the	bonding	
force.	We	are	bound	together	with	those	with	whom,	like	it	or	not,	our	own	fates	and	our	own	well-being	are	
interwoven.	That,	and	not	a	sum	of	money	to	be	repaid,	is	the	sense	of	the	acknowledgement	of	debt.
31
	
The	developments	described	above	demonstrate	the	state’s	extension	of	the	type	of	solidarity	
associated	with	 the	 operation	 of	 a	welfare	 institution	 such	 as	 the	NHS.	 For	 no	 longer	 is	 the	
community	of	taxpayers	solely	‘liable	for	the	reversals	of	[social]	fortunes’	of	others	within	the	
group	–	that	is,	those	who	become	ill.	Additionally,	through	the	legal	institution	of	contract,	this	
community’s	liability	is	extended	to	embrace	the	costs	and	risks	and	harms	of	those	operating	
in	the	private	sector.	And	while	sums	of	money	do	indeed	need	to	be	repaid	(and	paid)	by	the	
																																																																		
31
	A.	Wildt,	‘Solidarity:	Its	History	and	Contemporary	Definition’,	in	Solidarity,	ed.	K.	Bayertz	(1999),	p.	6.	Reference	
omitted.	
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community	to	this	sector,	the	underlying	source	of	this	obligation	is	the	political	creation	of	a	
bond	between	the	public	and	the	private,	 the	social	and	the	economic.	Through	 its	contracts	
with	the	private	sector,	the	state	 increasingly	binds	the	social	and	economic	 ‘fates’	and	‘well-
being’	of	 its	 citizens	 to	 the	private	 sector,	 its	agents,	and	market	mechanisms	such	 that	 they	
become	interwoven,	or	inextricably	linked,	with	these.	
What	this	scenario	reveals	then	is	the	indispensability	of	a	key	welfare	institution	and	its	large	
fund	of	public	resources	for	the	prospects	of	capital	and	profit	accumulation	within	the	NHS.	It	
also	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 state	moulds	 this	welfare	 institution	 and	 its	 underlying	mode	 of	
social	relations	(solidarity)	to	work	towards	those	ends.	Together	with	competition	and	contract	
law,	these	become	crucial	institutional	mechanisms	for	realising	the	political	desire	to	develop	
markets	and	increase	the	role	of	the	private	sector.	
(ii)	 Workfare,	Contract	and	Social	Relations	
We	saw	earlier	that	workfare	serves	capital	by	supporting	the	flexible	labour	markets	that	are	
deemed	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 countries’	 economies	 are,	 and	 remain,	 competitive.
32
	 But	what	
does	this	social	policy	reveal	about	the	type	of	institutional	mechanism	deployed	by	the	state	to	
produce	this	market-friendly	outcome?	And	what	form	of	social	relations	is	expressed	through	
this	mechanism?	
																																																																		
32
	This	justification	can	be	seen	in	the	current	UK	Government’s	White	Paper	on	welfare	reform,	where	the	existing	
welfare	system	is	said	not	to	‘reflect	the	needs	of	a	flexible	labour	market’.	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions,	
Universal	Credit:	Welfare	that	Works	(2010;	Cm.	7957)	10.	The	new	system	of	Universal	Credit	will,	in	contrast,	
‘drive	dynamic	labour	market	effects’.	Id.,	p.	58.	
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The	 workfare	 contract	 –	 or	 ‘claimant	 commitment’,	 as	 it	 is	 now	 known	 after	 the	
implementation	of	the	Welfare	Reform	Act	2012	(WRA	2012)	–	is	the	social	policy	mechanism	
used	by	the	state	to	support	flexible	 labour	markets.	The	choice	of	contract	 is	 important	as	 it	
presents	a	powerful	 image	of	 the	person	and	social	 relations	 that	 is	 intuitively	attractive	and	
worthy	of	support,	especially	in	today’s	consumer-driven	society.	This	image	is	founded	upon	a	
liberal	political	rationality	that	conceives	of	the	self	as	a	rational,	self-determining	agent,	who	
makes	autonomous	choices	about	whether	to	enter	agreements	based	upon	self-assessments	
of	individual	utility.	As	such,	the	workfare	contract	does	not,	in	theory	at	least,	compel	welfare	
beneficiaries	to	sign	up	to	it;	rather	it	emphasises	the	importance	of	consent,	negotiation	and	
reciprocity	 in	 the	construction	of	 the	agreement.	 In	other	words,	 it	envisages	 formal	equality	
between	the	contracting	parties.	This	 is	 important	as	it	means	that,	by	being	deemed	to	have	
voluntarily	 chosen	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 contract,	welfare	 recipients	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 have	 freely	
negotiated	and	accepted	the	responsibilities	under	the	agreement.	In	other	words,	they	can	be	
assumed	 to	 have	 bound	 themselves	 to	 the	 obligations	 in	 the	 contract	 –	which	 are	 that	 they	
work,	seek	work,	or	undertake	training	with	a	view	to	working	in	a	flexible	labour	market.	As	a	
number	of	scholars	have	pointed	out,	the	empirical	reality	of	workfare	and	other	‘social	control	
contracts’	does	not	reflect	any	practical	implementation	of	the	theoretical	contract	norms	such	
as	reciprocity	and	consent.
33
	The	truth	is	that,	if	the	unemployed	wish	to	obtain	benefits,	they	
have	 little	 option	 but	 to	 accept	 the	 conditions	 in	 the	 workfare	 contract.	 There	 is	 a	 vast	
inequality	of	bargaining	power	between	welfare	beneficiaries	and	welfare	state	administrators.	
																																																																		
33
	See,	for	example,	P.	Vincent-Jones,	The	New	Public	Contracting:	Regulation,	Responsiveness,	Relationality	(2006),	
Ch.	9	and	M.	Freedland	and	D.	King,	‘Contractual	Governance	and	Illiberal	Contracts:	Some	Problems	of	
Contractualism	as	an	Instrument	of	Behaviour	Management	by	Agencies	of	Government’	(2003)	27	Cambridge	
Journal	of	Economics	465.	
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In	one	sense,	however,	this	does	not	really	matter,	for	the	crucial	point	is	that,	whether	or	not	
those	 contractual	 norms	 are	 replicated	 in	 practice,	 they	 are	 treated	 as	 if	 they	 are.	 It	 is	 the	
ideological	dimension	of	the	workfare	contract	–	that	is,	its	ability	to	represent	unemployment	
and	the	solutions	to	it	as	revolving	around	a	formally	equal	set	of	social	relations	characterised	
by	matters	of	 individual	choice	and	responsibility	–	that	 is	 important	here.	Possible	structural	
causes	of	unemployment,	 such	as	 flexible	 labour	markets	 themselves,	 are	obscured,	allowing	
politicians	to	claim	these	markets	as	solutions	to	the	problem,	rather	than	as	the	problem	itself.	
Consistent	 with	 the	 ideological	 dimension	 of	 the	 workfare	 contract	 is	 the	 threat	 of	 the	
application	of	financial	sanctions	for	either	breaches	of	the	contract	or	a	failure	to	enter	into	it	
at	all.	This	has	been	a	core	feature	of	workfare	and	has	been	continued	and	deepened	in	the	
WRA	2012.34	Essentially,	unemployment	benefit	is	reduced	in	stages	depending	on	the	severity	
and	number	of	 contractual	breaches,	 the	 classification	of	 claimant,	 and	 the	 type	of	workfare	
programme.	While	 the	 presence	 of	 those	 sanctions	 may	 confirm	 the	 critique	 that	 workfare	
contracts	are	not	based	on	the	norm	of	consent	(for	the	inevitable	reduction	in	or	removal	of	
one’s	 unemployment	 benefit	 in	 the	 event	 of	 non-compliance	 effectively	 leaves	 the	 claimant	
with	no	practical	alternative	but	to	agree	to	the	conditions),	again	it	is	the	ideological	aspect	of	
contract	 –	 that	 you	 must	 suffer	 the	 consequences	 of	 breaches	 of	 your	 voluntarily	 assumed	
obligations	–	that	is	crucial	in	lending	legitimacy	to	a	policy	designed	to	entrench	flexible	labour	
markets.	Moreover,	 this	 punitive	 element	 of	 the	workfare	 contract	 feeds	 into	more	 populist	
notions	surrounding	those	groups	assumed	to	be	heavily	reliant	on	welfare	benefits	–	that	they	
																																																																		
34
	For	more	detail	on	this,	see	ss.	26	and	27	of	the	WRA	2012	and	the	Act’s	preceding	White	Paper,	Department	for	
Work	and	Pensions,	op	cit.,	Ch.	3.	
Page	|	20		
	
are	up	to	no	good,	lazy,	cheating	the	system	etc.	The	call	for	them	to	find	a	job	and	relieve	the	
taxpayer	 of	 unnecessary	 costs	 also	 serves	 to	 further	 contemporary	 social	 policy’s	 aim	 of	
securing	the	presence	of	flexible	labour	markets	and,	hence,	a	more	competitive	economy.	
It	could	be	argued	that	other	mechanisms,	such	as	the	Mandatory	Work	Activity	scheme,	have	
been	 developed	 with	 the	 same	 objective	 of	 maintaining	 flexible	 labour	 markets	 in	 mind.	
Purportedly	 designed	 for	 jobseekers	 who	 would	 ‘benefit	 from	 experiencing	 the	 habits	 and	
routines	of	working	life’,
35
	viewed	from	another	angle	it	is	simply	a	mechanism	for	ensuring	the	
flow	of	free	labour	for	employers	operating	within	flexible	labour	markets.
36
	What	all	of	these	
mechanisms	demonstrate	however,	 is	 the	 crucial	 constitutive	 role	 the	 state	plays	 through	 its	
social	policy	in	developing	and	maintaining	flexible	labour	markets.	In	that	sense	they	bear	out	
Polanyi’s	observation	 that	 the	 state’s	 intervention	 is	 crucial	 in	establishing	and	maintaining	a	
market	economy.	
Workfare	also	contains	elements	pointing	 to	a	Polanyian	disembedding	of	 the	economy	 from	
society;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 policy	 is	 not	 necessarily	 designed	 to	 protect	 society	 and	 its	
members	from	the	deleterious	human	consequences	of	the	operation	of	markets.	On	the	one	
hand,	 this	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 provision	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 benefits	 from	 those	 failing	 to	
discharge	their	contractual	workfare	obligations.	On	the	other	hand,	by	binding	beneficiaries	to	
flexible	 labour	 markets,	 jobseekers	 become	 subject	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 insecurity	
associated	with	this	type	of	market.	I	have	described	elsewhere	empirical	evidence	suggesting	
that	those	entering	the	labour	market	through	workfare	programmes	often	find	themselves	in	
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	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions,	op	cit.,	p.	29.	
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	The	Mandatory	Work	Activity	scheme	involves	an	unpaid	full-time	work	placement	lasting	a	maximum	of	four	
weeks.	
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precarious	 forms	 of	 employment	 and,	 eventually,	 back	 on	 benefits	 –	 the	 so-called	 revolving	
door	syndrome.37	Consequently,	workfare	is	very	different	to	the	types	of	protective	measures	
Polanyi	described	as	emerging	 from	the	1870s.	 Importantly,	 it	would	not	appear	 to	serve	the	
types	of	non-economic	interest	–	‘safety	and	security,	the	form	of	a	man’s	life,	the	breadth	of	
his	 existence,	 the	 stability	 of	 his	 environment’	 –	 Polanyi	 viewed	 as	 a	 condition	 of	
embeddedness.	 Indeed,	 quite	 the	 opposite	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 the	 case,	 as	 workfare	
jeopardises	those	interests	and	threatens	to	produce	what	Robert	Castel	has	described	as	the	
individual’s	‘disaffiliation’:	
that	is,	rupture	of	the	bond	within	society.	The	final	outcome,	the	end	of	this	process,	is	that	economic	insecurity	
becomes	destitution	and	fragility	of	relationships	becomes	isolation	...	Poverty	is	revealed	as	the	outcome	of	a	
series	of	breakdowns	 in	belonging	and	 failures	 to	establish	bonds,	which	 finally	 throws	the	person	concerned	
into	a	floating	state,	a	sort	of	social	no-man’s	land.
38
	
Revealingly,	 the	 possibility	 of	 disaffiliation	 in	 the	 present	 context	 arises	 through	 the	
intervention	of	the	welfare	state	and	its	objective	of	supporting	flexible	labour	markets.	It	is	a	
social	 cost	 written	 into	 the	 state’s	 social	 policy	 –	 a	 form	 of	 policy	 originally	 designed	 to	
ameliorate	the	worst	social	and	economic	consequences	of	capitalism.	 In	Polanyi’s	terms,	not	
only	 is	 this	an	example	of	 ‘the	running	of	society	as	an	adjunct	to	the	market’;	 it	also	reveals	
that	 the	 institutions	most	 traditionally	associated	with	embeddedness	have	today	themselves	
become	important	vehicles	of	disembeddedness.	
The	 next,	 and	 final,	 section	 draws	 together	 the	 paper’s	 themes	 by	 reflecting	 upon	 what	
implications	 they	might	have	 for	our	understanding	of	 the	 relationship	between	 law	and	 the	
welfare	state	today.	
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	K.	Veitch,	‘Social	Solidarity	and	the	Power	of	Contract’	(2011)	38	Journal	of	Law	and	Society	189.	
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	 R.	 Castel,	 ‘The	 Roads	 to	 Disaffiliation:	 Insecure	 Work	 and	 Vulnerable	 Relationships’	 (2000)	 24	 International	
Journal	of	Urban	and	Regional	Research	519,	at	520.	Emphases	added.	
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Law	and	the	Contemporary	Welfare	State	
Historically,	what	were	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 upon	 law?	Having	
identified	formal	rational	 law	as	the	form	of	 law	characteristic	of	Western	modernity	and	the	
rise	of	the	capitalist	economy,	Weber	notes	the	challenges	being	made	to	the	formal	qualities	
of	 modern	 law.	 With	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 ‘modern	 class	 problem’,	 there	 arose	 ‘[n]ew	
demands	 for	 a	 “social	 law”	 to	 be	 based	 upon	 such	 emotionally	 colored	 ethical	 postulates	 as	
“justice”	 or	 “human	 dignity”,	 and	 directed	 against	 the	 very	 dominance	 of	 a	 mere	 business	
morality’.39	This	 results	 in	what	Weber	calls	 the	materialisation	of	 formal	 law,	as	 law’s	 formal	
and	 abstract	 system	 of	 general	 rules	 becomes,	 inter	 alia,	 more	 particularistic	 (designed	 to	
further	specific	economic	or	social	purposes	within	commercial	or	labour	law,	for	instance)	and	
involved	 in	 the	management	 of	 class	 conflict.	 This	 dilutes	 its	 formal,	 impartial	 and	 technical	
character	as	its	function	shifts	from	ensuring	the	equality	of	legal	subjects	before	the	law	to	the	
implementation	of	particular	governmental	social	policies	designed	to	redress	the	inequalities	
arising	 from	 capitalism.	 In	 other	 words,	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 the	 form	 and	
function	of	law	alter	from	those	characteristic	of	the	liberal	state.40	
How	 might	 the	 legislation	 considered	 in	 this	 paper	 fit	 within	 this	 historical	 trajectory	 from	
formal	 rational	 law	 to	 social	 law?	The	 first	point	 to	note	 is	 that	 it	displays	elements	of	 social	
law.	 Thus	 the	 Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 Act	 2012,	 for	 example,	 depicts	 a	 welfare	 system	 that,	
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	M.	Weber,	Economy	and	Society	(1978),	p.	886.	
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	Weber’s	 identification	of	 the	materialisation	of	 law	has	given	rise	 to	a	sizeable	 literature	on	this	 topic,	 largely	
taken	 up	 via	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 juridification.	 See,	 for	 instance,	 J.	 Habermas,	 The	 Theory	 of	
Communicative	 Action	 –	 Volume	 2:	 Lifeworld	 and	 System	 (1987),	 356-73;	 G.	 Teubner,	 ‘Juridification:	 Concepts,	
Aspects,	 Limits,	 Solutions’	 in	 Juridification	 of	 Social	 Spheres:	 A	 Comparative	 Analysis	 in	 the	 Areas	 of	 Labor,	
Corporate,	Antitrust	and	Social	Welfare	Law,	ed.	G.	Teubner	(1987),	3-48;	and,	F.	Ewald,	‘A	Concept	of	Social	Law’	
in	Dilemmas	of	 Law	 in	 the	Welfare	 State,	 ed.	G.	 Teubner	 (1986),	 40-75.	 Limitations	of	 space	do	not	 allow	 for	 a	
discussion	of	this	literature	here.	
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despite	cuts	in	expenditure,	continues	to	operate	on	the	principle	of	solidarity	–	in	the	sense	of	
a	social	fund	in	which	the	community	pools	risks	and	there	is	an	element	of	redistribution.	For	
instance,	 in	principle	 at	 least,	 access	 to	NHS	 services	 continues	 to	be	based	on	 clinical	 need,	
rather	than	the	ability	to	pay.	
But	 this	 Act	 and	 the	Welfare	 Reform	 Act	 2012	 also	 contain	 evidence	 of	 elements	 of	 formal	
rational	 law	 and	 an	 image	 of	 social	 relations	 influenced	 by	 the	 liberal	 political	 rationality	
associated	with	this	form	of	law.	Thus,	the	possibility	of	applying	competition	law	to	ensure	the	
absence	 of	 anti-competitive	 behaviour	 introduces	 a	 degree	 of	 formal	 equality	 into	 the	 NHS	
commissioning	process,	and	the	use	of	contract	 law	as	the	legal	mechanism	upon	which	PPPs	
rest	stresses	the	importance	of	the	formal	notion	that	agreements	freely	entered	into	between	
parties	must	be	upheld.	The	fact	that	the	outcomes	of	the	implementation	of	these	formal	legal	
processes	may	not	lead,	in	Weber’s	words,	to	“justice”	or	“human	dignity”,	does	not	affect	their	
legal	validity.	This	differs	from	social	law,	which,	François	Ewald	argues,	operates	on	the	basis	of	
“solidarity	contracts”	–	a	notion	of	contract	‘founded	on	ideas	of	fair	distribution	or	equitable	
allocation	 of	 social	 burdens	 and	 profits’.41	 Similarly,	 the	 workfare	 contract	 and	 claimant	
commitment,	while	not	strictly	legal	entities,	are	founded	on	the	same	idea	of	social	relations	–	
characterising	 jobseekers	 as	 self-determining,	 self-interested	 actors	 who	 freely	 enter	 into	
contracts	and	accept	obligations	with	a	view	to	maximising	their	individual	utility.	Once	again,	
while	entering	into	the	contract	or	commitment	may	result	in	injustice	or	human	indignity	(one	
might	think,	for	instance,	of	the	lack	of	pay	for	work	undertaken	through	the	Mandatory	Work	
Activity	 scheme),	 founding	 these	 contracts	 and	 commitments	 upon	 both	 this	 idea	 of	 social	
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relations	 and	 the	 formal	 properties	 of	 contract	 law	 means	 that	 those	 types	 of	 social	
consequences	have	no	bearing	on	the	legal	validity	of	workfare	mechanisms.	
Those	Acts	therefore	display	elements	of	both	social	law	and	formal	rational	law.	Importantly,	
the	 latter	 functions	 as	 a	 central	 institutional	 mechanism	 through	 which	 the	 welfare	 state	
establishes,	 supports	 and	 maintains	 markets	 today	 (flexible	 labour	 markets	 in	 the	 case	 of	
workfare	 and	 a	market	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 and	 infrastructure	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health	
care).	Within	the	sphere	of	social	policy,	formal	rational	 law	and	its	associated	liberal	form	of	
social	relations	are	therefore	constitutive	of	the	development	of	markets	and	opportunities	for	
capital	 accumulation	 and	 profit	 making.	 Those	 functions	 demonstrate	 one	 of	 Polanyi’s	 key	
arguments,	namely	that	state	 intervention	 is	crucial	 to	the	establishment	and	continuation	of	
free	 markets.	 Laissez-faire	 did	 not	 require	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 flourish;	
instead,	 it	demanded	constant	state	policing	and	assistance.	Law,	of	course,	had,	and	has,	an	
integral	 role	 to	play	 in	 this.	Contract	and	property	 law,	 for	example,	are	essential	not	only	 in	
providing,	 via	 principles	 such	 as	 freedom	 of	 contract,	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 private	 property	
rights	 within	 an	 already	 existing	 market;	 they	 are	 foundational	 in	 establishing	 markets.	 As	
Paddy	Ireland	notes:	
[P]roperty	 and	 markets	 are	 legal,	 political	 and	 social	 constructs	 –	 the	 products	 as	 well	 as	 the	 objects	 of	
regulation;	and	thus,	as	a	result,	not	only	is	the	goal	of	“deregulation”	absurd,	the	dynamics	and	rationalities	of	
particular	markets	are	themselves	inevitably	political	and	legal	products	which	vary	according	to	the	legal	rights-
obligations-regulatory	structures	that	constitute	them.
42
	
This	brings	us	to	one	of	the	central	points	to	emerge	from	the	analysis	undertaken	in	this	paper.	
For	the	creation	of	markets	and	the	carving	out	of	opportunities	for	capital	accumulation	and	
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profit	making	 in	 the	welfare	arena	are	not	 the	products	of	 formal	 rational	 law	alone.	Rather,	
they	are	also	‘political	and	social	constructs’.	In	order	to	function	effectively,	formal	rational	law	
requires	a	propitious	political	and	social	environment.	In	the	present	case,	this	takes	the	form	
of	a	combination	of	a	large	communal	resource,	based	on	the	principle	of	solidarity,	from	which	
funds	can	periodically	be	extracted	by	the	private	sector,	and	the	institution	of	a	liberal	political	
rationality	within	social	policy	that	views	social	relations	as	being	based	on	an	image	of	people	
as	 self-determining,	 self-interested	 actors	 who	 voluntarily	 create	 their	 responsibilities	 via	
consensual	 agreements.	 Given	 that,	 politically,	 it	 would	 be	 unfeasible	 simply	 to	 dismantle	
welfare	 institutions	 and	 move	 to	 a	 system	 of	 private	 insurance,	 the	 desire	 to	 use	 these	
institutions	 as	 sources	 of	 economic	 growth	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 requires	 the	 careful	
construction	of	a	legal,	political	and	social	system	geared	towards	this	end	(a	‘state-crafting’,	to	
deploy	 Loïc	Wacquant’s	 phrase
43
).	While	 this	 includes	 implementing	what	 for	 the	 post-WWII	
welfare	 state	 are	 new	 legal	 mechanisms	 and	 political	 rationalities	 (albeit	 they	 have	 a	 much	
older	provenance),	it	also	involves	putting	what	might	be	called	the	existing	system	of	public	or	
social	wealth	at	 the	service	of	markets,	capital	accumulation,	and	profit	making.	The	result	 is	
that	 the	 solidarity	 fund	 takes	 on	 an	 additional	 redistributive	 function	 –	 redistributing	wealth	
away	 from	 those	 for	 whom	 it	 was	 originally	 intended	 and	 towards	 those	 who	 operate	 the	
system	 –	 the	 capitalist	 economy	 –	 responsible	 for	 producing	 the	 need	 for	 a	 welfare	 state	
initially.	 While	 redistribution	 to	 the	 non-owners	 of	 capital	 still	 occurs	 through	 the	 welfare	
system	today,	there	is	greater	potential	for	recent	social	policy,	and	the	type	of	law	it	institutes	
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within	the	welfare	system	(formal	rational	law),	to	produce	injustice	and	human	indignity	as	a	
result	of	its	concern	to	further	Weber’s	‘business	morality’.	
This	 raises	 a	 final	 point,	which	 is	 that	 the	 form	of	 law	 increasingly	 to	 be	 found	within	 social	
policy	 and	 legislation	 becomes	 complicit	 in	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 to	 produce	
conditions	of	social	suffering	rather	than	the	social	protection	one	had	come	to	expect	of	it.	As	
social	policy	becomes	concerned	with	issues	of	reducing	costs	by,	inter	alia,	furthering	the	role	
of	the	private	sector,	and	with	sustaining	flexible	labour	markets,	so	the	form	of	law	deployed	
to	support	those	objectives	begins	to	become	constitutive	of	an	erosion	of	social	protection	and	
the	consequences,	such	as	social	dislocation	and	economic	 insecurity,	 identified	earlier.	Here,	
the	law	of	the	welfare	state	begins	to	exhibit	what	Alain	Supiot	has	described	in	the	context	of	
labour	law	as	‘the	separation	of	things	and	persons’.	There,	he	argues	that	today	‘work	figures	
as	a	thing	divested	of	the	person	and	available	for	purchase	and	sale,	and	the	person	features	
only	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ‘needs’	 which	 are	 so	 compelling	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 by	 the	
collectivity.’44	 But	 as	 welfare	 policy	 itself	 is	 increasingly	 tailored	 towards	 private	 ends,	 it	 too	
becomes	 ‘divested	 of	 the	 person’,	 as	 the	 approach	 to	 unemployment	 benefit	 via	 workfare	
demonstrates.	 Unlike	 the	 protective	 legislation	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 that	
Polanyi	discusses,	the	 legislation	described	 in	this	paper	 is	not	exclusively	concerned	with	the	
protection	 of	 non-economic	 interests,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 one	 might	 consider	 welfare	 as	
indispensable	to	what	Polanyi	describes	as	‘the	substance	of	society’.	For	welfare	–	‘the	state	of	
faring	 or	 doing	 well:	 freedom	 from	 calamity,	 etc.’45	 –	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 providing	 the	
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conditions	 for	human	beings	not	simply	 to	exist,	but	 to	 flourish	 (of	 ‘doing	well’).	Health	care,	
education,	decent	work,	and	shelter	are	all	preconditions	for	the	realisation	of	this	flourishing.	
The	 rise	 of	 formal	 rational	 law	within	 the	welfare	 sector	 operates	 as	 part	 of	 an	 institutional	
framework	responsible	 for	the	steady	erosion	of	such	an	understanding	of,	and	aspiration	to,	
welfare,	and	its	replacement	with	one	in	which	Weber’s	‘business	morality’	begins	to	dominate.	
